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Based on the existing trace distance result, we present a simple and efficient method to tighten
the upper bound of the guessing probability. The guessing probability of final key k can be upper
bounded by the guessing probability of another key k′, if k′ can be mapped from final key k. Com-
paring with the known methods, our result is more tightened by thousands of orders of magnitude.
For example, given a 10−9-secure key from the sifted key, the upper bound of the guessing proba-
bility is 2× 10−3277 using our method. This value is smaller than the existing result 10−9 by more
than 3000 orders of magnitude. Our result shows that, in the viewpoint of guessing probability, the
performance of the existing trace distance security is actually much better than what was assumed
in the past.
I. Introduction The first Quantum Key Distribution
(QKD) protocol was proposed by Bennett and Brassard
in 1984, based on the fundamentals of quantum me-
chanics [1]. Since then, the security of QKD has al-
ways been the central issue in the quantum cryptographic
field [2]. Trace distance is a very important security cri-
terion [3, 4]. It provides the universal composable se-
curity [5, 6], which can guarantee the security of key
whatever its application may be, such as one-time pad
(OTP). This is why many studies choose trace distance
for security criterion [3, 4, 7, 8].
In a classical practical cryptosystem, the impact of
guessing probability on security is very important [9, 10].
Especially, the key generated by QKD protocol is not
based on the presumed hardness of mathematical prob-
lems, so the eavesdropper Eve can only guess the final
key via the measurement result of her probe. The guess-
ing probability intuitively describes the probability that
Eve can correctly guesses the final key, which can reflect
the number of guesses that Eve needs to get the correct
final key.
There are few studies on the guessing probability of
QKD. Since there are more regorous security measure
such as the trace distance [5, 6], which gives the com-
posable security. This makes the crucially important
theoretical foundation for security of QKD. However, in
the real application of QKD projects, customers often
ask the question of guessing probablity. The existing
prior art results cannot give them a satisfactory upper
bound [11]. Consequently, some people questioned the
security of QKD by relying on the prior art results of
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guessing probability [12]. For example, according to the
existing result [11], the guessing probability of an ε-secure
key is about 10−9 if ε is around 10−9. Although the final
key is far secure than the 30 bits of perfect key, it can be
easily mistaken for that there are only 30 bits of security
in QKD system [12], just because they have the same
guessing probability. In practice, it is not unusual that
we need the guessing probability to be much smaller such
as 10−100 or 10−1000. Therefore, it is extremely impor-
tant to find a more tightened upper bound of guessing
probability. In this letter, starting from the composable
security through the trace distance [2], we give a very ef-
ficient and simple method to evaluate the guessing prob-
ability. Typically, compared with those previous results,
the method proposed here can reduce by hundreds or
even thousands orders of magnitude for the upper bound
value of the guessing probability.
II. The guessing probability We consider the secu-
rity definitions of a practical QKD protocol with finite-
size under the framework of composable security [3, 4, 13,
14]. Suppose that Alice and Bob get two N -bit sifted key
strings, s and s′. By performing an error correction and
private amplification scheme, Alice gets a n1-bit key k
and Bob gets an estimate key kˆ of k from s and s′. The
protocol is εcor-correct if P [k 6= kˆ] ≤ εcor. In general,
the key k of Alice can be correlated with an eavesdrop-
per system and the density matrix of Alice and Eve is
ρAE . The protocol outputs an ε-secure key [7], if
1
2
‖ ρAE − ρU ⊗ ρE ‖1≤ ε, (1)
where ‖  ‖1 denotes the trace norm, ρU is the fully
mixed state of Alice’s system. The protocol is εtol-secure
if εcor and ε satisfies εcor + ε ≤ εtol which means it is
εtol-indistinguishable from a perfect protocol (which is
correct and secret). Without any loss of generality, we
consider the case of εcor = ε in this article.
ar
X
iv
:1
90
4.
12
07
5v
3 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
7 A
ug
 20
19
2We define the security level:
Definition 1 If key k is ε-secure, we also say the security
level of key k is ε.
For symbol clarity, we shall use notation εk for the
security level of key k. With this definition, we shall say
key k is εk-secure, or its security level is εk.
We define the guessing probability:
Definition 2 Let the final key generated by QKD proto-
col be k, the guessing probability of k is defined as the
success probability of the attacker Eve guessing the final
key via her measurement result, and is denoted as p(k).
Lemma 1 The guessing probability of an εk-secure key
k with length n1 is not larger than
1
2n1 + εk.
This is a conclusion from Ref. [11]. The proof has
been given in Ref. [11] already, for readers convenience,
we write the proof again in the Appendix A.
According to Lemma 1, the guessing probability of key
k can be divided into two parts and one part 2−n1 is
related to the length of the key, the other part εk(n1)
is related to the security level. Under the framework
of universally composable security, when calculating the
final key length, we often make the security level between
10−9 ∼ 10−24 which is much bigger than 2−n1 , because
n1 is often 10
3, 104 or more larger. Therefore, 2−n1 can
be ignored and p(k) ≤ p¯(k) ∼ O(ε(k)). In that case,
however, the guessing probability of a secure key with
a length of tens of bits can also reach this magnitude.
Therefore, when the secure requirements are very high,
it is obviously not enough for a key with a length of
thousands or even longer if the upper bound of guessing
probability only stops at this magnitude. Therefore, we
cannot simply use this formula alone to get the upper
bound of the guessing probability. Fortunately, we have
a much better way for tightening the bound. That is
what we will present in the following.
Lemma 2 If key k can be mapped to string k′ by a map
M that is known to Eve, then the guessing probability of
k cannot be larger than the guessing probability of string
k′ i.e.,
p(k) ≤ p(k′). (2)
Here p(k), p(k′) are guessing probabilities of k and k′,
respectively.
Proof. This lemma is obvious, just because when Eve
can correctly guess the k, Eve can obtain the k′ definitely
due to knowing the map M . Otherwise, Eve can still
correctly guess the k′ with a probability not less than 0,
i.e. p(k′) = p(k) + δ, δ ≥ 0.
Theorem 1: If an εk-secure key k with length n1 can
be mapped to an εk′ -secure key k
′ with length n2, the
guessing probability of k cannot be larger than k′, i.e.
p(k) ≤ p¯(k′) = 1
2n2
+ εk′ . (3)
Proof. This theorem actually requests two conditions:
i) the final key k can be mapped to the string k′,
ii) the string k′ can be regarded as a εk′ -secure key.
With these two conditions, the proof is very simple.
Given the condition i), we can apply Lemma 2 to obtain
p(k) ≤ p(k′). (4)
Given the condition ii), we can apply Lemma 1 to obtain
p(k′) ≤ p¯(k′) = 1
2n2
+ εk′ , (5)
And according to Eqs. (4) and (5), we can obtain
p(k) ≤ p¯(k′) = 1
2n2
+ εk′ . (6)
This ends our proof of Theorem 1.
As discussed above if the length of the final key k and
the string k′ is very large, then 2−n1 and 2−n2 can be
ignored. Meanwhile, when n2 < n1, we have εk′ < εk.
Thus, 2−n2 + εk′ ∼ εk′ ≤ εk ∼ 2−n1 + εk. That is, The-
orem 1 gives a more tightened upper bound of guessing
probability.
III. Method With Theorem 1, it is now possible for
us to get the upper bound of the guessing probability
of an εk-secure key k much tightly. Instead of directly
applying Lemma 1, we choose to first map k to a n2-
bit string k′ = M(k). If string k′ itself can be regarded
as an εk′ -secure final key, we can apply Theorem 1 now
through calculating p¯(k′). And we can obtain a much
smaller upper bound of the guessing probability of k if εk′
is very small and n2 is not too small. Now the problems
remaining for us is what is the map M , and how to make
sure that k′ = M(k) is another key which is εk′ -secure,
and how to calculate εk′ . We start our method with the
hashing function in the key distillation.
Our hashing function. We take the key distillation
with the random matrix. Denote RnN as the n × N
random matrix with each element being either 0 or 1,
randomly. Also, we represent the N -bit sifted string s by
a column vector S which contains N elements. To obtain
a n-bit final key, we simply take the calculation RnNS.
As one may check it easily here that our random matrix
is a class of two-universal hashing function family[2].
Suppose we have distilled out the n1-bit key k from
the N -bit sifted key s through hashing by our random
matrix Rn1N . We can map the n1-bit key k into the n2-
bit string k′ = M(k) simply by deleting the last n1 − n2
bits from key string k. Obviously, this string k′ mapped
from k can also be regarded as another final key distilled
from sift key S by the n2 × N random hashing matrix
Rn2N , which is a submatrix of Rn1N . In summary, we
have
k′ = M(k) = Rn2NS. (7)
This means, on the one hand, k′ is a string mapped
from key k. And on the other hand, k′ can be regarded
as another final key of length n2 distilled from sifted key
s. Since the two conditions in Theorem 1 are satisfied,
according to Theorem 1, we can get a tightened upper
3bound of p(k) with Eq. (3), if we know the security level
of key k′, i.e., the value of εk′ . Since our random matrix is
a class of two-universal hashing function, the value εk′ is
dependent on n2 [4]. Details are shown in the Appendix
B on the calculation of εk′ given n2. Hence, in a QKD
protocol using random hashing matrix presented here, to
get the upper bound of the guessing probability of the n1-
bit final key k, we can summarize the procedure above
by the following scheme:
Scheme 1) Given the n1-bit final key k, we delete its
last n1−n2 bits and obtain string k′. 2) We regard k′ as
another possible final key which is εk′ -secure. Compute
the εk′ value of k
′ with the input parameters N and n2.
3) Calculate p¯(k) by Theorem 1 through Eq. (3).
Since in our scheme, the value of εk′ is dependent on
n2 as shown in the Appendix B, we can now replace εk′
by a functional form, εk′(n2). To obtain a tightened up-
per bound value of the guessing probability in scheme
1, we need to choose an appropriate n2 value. In our
calculation, we set the condition
2−n2 = εk′(n2), (8)
for the appropriate n2.
On the one hand, for any n > n2, we have εk(n) >
εk′(n2) = 2
−n2 ; on the other hand, for any n < n2, we
have 2−n > 2−n2 . In conclusion, if n 6= n2, 2−n+εk(n) >
2−n2 . Therefore, in this study, we set 2−n2 = εk′(n2),
and get a tightened guessing probability 2−n2+1.
Once we find the value n2 and the corresponding
εk′(n2), we calculate p¯(k
′) by Eq. (3). Obviously, this
is the upper bound of guessing probability of all those
final key k of length n1 provided that
n1 > n2. (9)
Thus we can actually use a more efficient scheme to get
the upper bound of the guessing probability of key k, as
the following Theorem 2:
Theorem 2: In a QKD protocol, if the n1-bit final
key k is distilled from the sifted key s by using random
matrix Rn1N , the guessing probability of k can be upper
bounded by
p(k) ≤ p¯(k′) = 2−(n2−1), (10)
where k′ = M(k) = Rn2NS and n2 satisfies 2
−n2 =
εk′(n2), n2 < n1.
There are two important points need to be noticed.
The first one is when applying our theorem to obtain the
non-trivial upper bound of the guessing probability for
the final key k, we do not really need to map k to another
string k′ and we only need the existence of a map that
can map k to k′. As shown above the existence has been
proven. The second one is that, in this letter, we use the
random matrix RnN as a family of two-universal hash
function to distill the key for illustrating our conclusion
more intuitively. Of course, we can also use the modified
toeplitz matrix [8] instead of random matrix RnN . In
FIG. 1: Flow chart of our method of bounding the guessing
probability.
Ntol 10
4 105 106
n 2.01× 103 4.06× 104 4.90× 105
pguessing[12] 10
−6 10−6 10−6
pguessing[11] 10
−9 10−9 10−9
pThm.2guessing 2× 10−32 2× 10−327 2× 10−3277
TABLE I: Comparison of the guessing probability in the case
of Qtol = 2.14% is the channel error tolerance, Nz = 0.22Ntol
is the length of string used to do parameter estimation, Ntol
is the total length of sifted key , N = 0.78Ntol is the length
of the string for key generation, ε = 10−9 is the security
level, n is the length of 10−9-secure key, and pguessing is the
probability that correctly guess the final key. In particular,
pThm.2guessing is the result of Theorem 2 of this work.
that case, the final key k can also be mapped to the
string k′ and the string k′ can also be regarded as a εk′ -
secure key. It means that the proposed theorem in this
study still holds. Therefore, the flow chart of our method
of bounding the guessing probability can be shown as
Fig. 1.
IV. Discussion Table. I describes the upper bounds
of the guessing probability calculated by different Ntol,
where Ntol is the length of total string that includes the
sifted keys for key generation and the string used to do
parameter estimation. In Table. I, Ntol = 10
4, 105, 106
respectively. We can see from Table. I that when Ntol =
106, n = 4.90 × 105 and the guessing probabilities ob-
tained using the methods of [12] and [11] are about
10−6 and 10−9 respectively. However, using our method
the guessing probability can be reduced to 2 × 10−3277
which is more tightened by thousands of orders of mag-
nitude than prior art methods. As the length of Ntol
increases, the length of final key also increases, but the
guessing probabilities in [12] and [11] almost remain un-
4Ntol 10
4 105 106
ε 10−9 10−9 10−9
n 2.01× 103 4.06× 104 4.90× 105
r 0.20 0.41 0.49
ε′ 10−32 10−327 10−3277
n′ 136 1.12× 103 1.10× 104
r′ 0.01 0.01 0.01
TABLE II: Comparison of the rate r = n/Ntol and r
′ =
n′/Ntol under the same parameter of Table. I. ε and ε′ are
the security level, n and n′ are the length of ε-secure key and
the length of ε′-secure key respectively.
changed. Compared with [12] and [11], the guessing
probability obtained by our method is significantly re-
duced, which is more realistic and tighter. It should be
noted that we calculate the case without the KPA in Ta-
ble. I. Now we consider the case of KPA in QKD with
our method. Suppose Eve has known t bits of the final
n2-bit key k
′, the guessing probability of an εk′ -secure
key k′ is pKPA(k′) ≤ 2−(n2−t−1). The upper bound of
guessing probability of key k′ now is equal to that of an
ideal (n2 − t− 1)-bit key.
Table. II compares the length of ε-secure key n and the
length of ε′-secure key n′ when the total length of sifted
key are 104, 105, 106 respectively. This table shows that
if we simply use lemma1, in order to achieve a smaller
security level ε′, the length of the ε′-secure key n′ is sig-
nificantly reduced compared with n, thereby greatly re-
ducing the rate r′ = n′/Ntol. However, using our method
of Theorem 2, at a higher rate r = n/Ntol, there is still
a very small guessing probability, as can be seen from
Table. I.
Our result shows that, in the viewpoint of guessing
probability, the performance of the existing trace dis-
tance security is actually much better than what was
assumed in the past. Incidentally, after Ref. [11], a
looser upper bound, 10−6 for Eve’s guessing probabil-
ity was presented [12]. We emphasize that this looser
upper bound does not in any sense make an evidence
for challenging the validity of the existing security proof
of QKD [11]. Although a large value of lower bound
of Eve’s guessing probability can show the insecurity, a
large value of upper bound cannot show the insecurity.
Note that, if one does not make any effort, one can also
conclude a large-value upper bound of 100% for Eve’s
guessing probability. Such a value is correct for upper
bound, but not meaningful: if any new upper bound is
larger than the prior art result, it only means that the
“new upper bound” is trivial and meaningless rather than
the invalidity of the prior art result.
Now we point out in which step Ref. [12] has over-
estimated the value of guessing probability. When the
security level is ε, the cases of d > ε leads to an empty
key because they do not meet the security criterion of
trace distance. So the situation of d > ε should not be
taken into consideration. But Eq.(30) of Ref. [12] calcu-
lates the guessing probability by the Markov inequality
and assumes the probability of d > ε is bigger than zero,
this will unreasonally loose the upper bound values of
guessing probability.
V. Conclusion In this letter, our goal is to obtain
a tightened guessing probability. Based on the existing
secure criterion (Trace distance) and a general property
of guessing probability, we propose a simple and efficient
method to tighten the upper bound of the guessing prob-
ability. We find that the guessing probability p(k) of
k can be upper bounded by 2−(n2−1), where n2 satis-
fies 2−n2 = εk′(n2) and n2 < n1. In particular, a sim-
ple random matrix RnN can be used to distill the final
key. Comparing with prior art results, of which the up-
per bound of the guessing probability of an ε-secure key is
about ε, our method gives a more tightened upper bound.
Therefore, the loose upper bound for the guessing prob-
ability was obtained in Ref. [12] cannot be regarded as
evidence to question the validity of existing the security
proof of QKD.
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Appendix A: the proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1 The guessing probability of an εk-secure key
k with length n1 is not larger than
1
2n1 + εk.
This is a conclusion from Ref. [11]. The proof has been
give in Ref. [11] already, here for readers convenience, we
write the proof again.
Proof. Let n-bit string x be the εx-secure key in X .
And the density matrix of Alice and Eve is ρXE and
satisfies
ρXE =
∑
x∈X
|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxE ,
1
2
‖ ρXE − ρUx ⊗ ρE ‖1≤ εx,
(A1)
where ρUx is the fully mixed state in X . Then we have
1
2
‖ρXE − ρUx ⊗ ρE‖1
≥1
2
‖
∑
x∈X
q(x)|x〉〈x| −
∑
x∈X
1
2n
|x〉〈x|‖1
=
1
2
∑
x∈X
|q(x)− 1
2n
|.
(A2)
5Eve’s guessing probability of string x is q(x), and
the maximum guessing probability is pguessing =
maxx∈X {q(x)}. Without any loss of generality, assum-
ing that the maximum guessing probability is q(x′). Note
that
∑
x∈X q(x) = 1, then the following holds
1
2
∑
x∈X
|q(x)− 1
2n
|
=
1
2
|q(x′)− 1
2n
|+ 1
2
∑
x∈X ,x 6=x′
|q(x)− 1
2n
|
≥1
2
|q(x′)− 1
2n
|+ 1
2
|
∑
x∈X ,x 6=x′
[q(x)− 1
2n
]|
=|q(x′)− 1
2n
|.
(A3)
From the Eqs.(A1)-(A3), we have pguessing ≤ 2−n1 +
εx, and thus for the n1-bit εk-secure key k, the guessing
probability satisfies
p(k) ≤ p¯(k) = 1
2n1
+ εk, (A4)
where p¯(k) is the upper bound of p(k). This ends our
proof of Lemma 1.
Appendix B: The calculation of εk′
We consider the security definitions of a practical QKD
protocol with finite-size under the framework of compos-
able security [4, 13, 14]. Suppose that Alice and Bob
get two N -bit sifted key strings. By performing an error
correction and private amplification scheme, Alice get a
n-bit final key k and Bob get an estimate kˆ of k. The
protocol is εcor-correct if P [k 6= kˆ] ≤ εcor. In general,
the key k of Alice can be correlated with an eavesdrop-
per system and the density matrix of Alice and Eve is
ρAE
The protocol outputs an εk-secure key [13], if
1
2
‖ ρAE − ρU ⊗ ρE ‖1≤ εk, (B1)
where ‖  ‖1 denotes the trace norm, ρU is the fully mixed
state of Alice’s system. The protocol is εtol-secure if εcor
and εk satisfies εcor + εk ≤ εtol which means it is εtol-
indistinguishable from a ideal protocol. Without any loss
of generality, we consider the case of εcor = εk.
From Lemma 1, we can calculate p¯(k) given the n-
bit εk-secure key k. In this situation, p¯(k) = 2
−n + εk.
However, in our method with random matrix R, we only
know N , the length of sifted key and n2, the length of
string k′ mapped from k. String k′ itself can also be
regarded as another final key distilled from sifted key.
According to Ref. [4], with N and n2, the final key is
εk′ -secure if εk′ satisfies the following equation:
n2 ≤ N [1− h(Qtol + µ)]− fNh(Qtol)− log 2
ε3k′
(B2)
where µ =
√
N+Nz
NNz
Nz+1
Nz
ln 2εk′
, Nz is the length of
string used for parameter estimation, h denotes the bi-
nary Shannon entropy function, h(x) = −x log x − (1 −
x) log(1− x) and Qtol represents the channel error toler-
ance. To obtain non-trivial results, we take equality in
Eq. (B2) to calculate the value of εk′ , given the input n2.
Since εk′ is dependent on n2, we use notation εk′(n2) for
εk′ . Here, εk′(n2) means, given n2, we find the value of
εk′ numerically by Eq. (B2)
In our calculation, we choose specific n2-value that sat-
isfies
2−n2 = εk′(n2). (B3)
Combining Eq. (B2),we obtain the following equation for
a tightened εk′ value:
−log εk′ = N [1−h(Qtol+µ)]−fNh(Qtol)−log 2
ε3k′
, (B4)
and we can calculate the value of εk′ and then calculate
the guessing probability by Eq. (8) in our main body
text.
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